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Abstract 
 
 
This paper focuses on the relationships between remittances and the share of individuals working for 
less than 2$ US per day. It is based on an original panel dataset containing information related to 
remittances in about 80 developing countries and to the number of workers being paid less than 2 
dollars per day as well. Even after factoring in the endogeneity of remittance inflows the results 
suggest that remittances lead to a decrease in the prevalence of working poor in receiving economies. 
This effect is stronger in a context of high macroeconomic volatility but is mitigated by the 
unpredictability of remittances: remittances are more effective to decreasing the share of working poor 
when they are easily predictable. Moreover, domestic finance and remittances appear as substitutes: 
remittances are less efficient in reducing the prevalence of working poor whenever finance is 
available.  
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Introduction 
According to the recent World Bank Report (World Bank “Migration and Remittances 
Factbook”, 2011), the worldwide remittance flows are estimated to have exceeded $440 
billion in 2010. From that amount, developing countries received $325 billion. The Report 
also highlights that recorded remittances were nearly three times the amount of official aid 
(ODA) and almost as large as foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to developing countries. 
For instance in Sub-Saharan Africa, remittances range from less than 1% of GDP to 25% in 
Lesotho, and they exceed by large both FDI and aid in countries like Mauritius, Nigeria, 
Egypt, Morocco, Senegal and Lesotho. Ratha (2009) summarized all existing empirical 
evidence and conclude that for a large fraction of the poorest nations, remittances exceed both 
ODA and FDI.  
Given this increasing evidence, it is not surprising that the last decade was marked by an 
increasing attention paid to the role played by remittances on development goals. At the 
macro level, the emphasis has been stressed on poverty, investment, growth, consumption, 
competitiveness and macroeconomic stability (Adams and Page, 2005; Woodruff and 
Zenteno, 2007; Chami et al., 2003; Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009; Catrinescu et al., 2009; 
Barajas et al., 2009; Bugamelli and Paterno, 2009; Chami, Hakura and Montiel., 2009; 
Combes and Ebeke, 2010; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2004; Barajas et al., 2010). At the 
micro level, a lot of research has been carried out on the relationships between labor supply 
and the income earned abroad and sent back by migrants (Funkhouser, 2006; Cox-Edwards 
and Rodriguez-Oreggia, 2009).  
This paper contributes to the debate over the impact of remittances on labor market outcomes 
in receiving countries in three ways. It is based upon a large dataset covering about 80 
developing and emerging countries over a large time span (1990-2008). This dataset contains 
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systematic information about remittances and the proportion of poor workers, which is 
defined as the proportion of individuals earning less than 2$ US per day. This allows a precise 
econometric estimate of the impact of remittances in reducing the number of poor workers. 
The results support the assumption that both the level and regularity of remittances reduce 
poverty, mitigate the sensitivity of the share of working poor with respect to macroeconomic 
shocks and finally, act as a substitute for shallowness financial markets.  
The paper contributes to two strands of the literature. One is related to the macroeconomic 
impact of remittances on growth and poverty. The impact of remittances on economic growth 
in receiving countries is a priori ambiguous. Remittances can be essentially spent on 
consumption and generate moral hazard, which is detrimental to growth (Chami et al., 2003). 
But they can also promote investment: in a world characterized by market imperfections and 
liquidity constraints, potential investors and micro entrepreneurs cannot raise the funds which 
would allow them to launch profitable activities (Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009). In this 
context, remittances provide households with available funds, which alleviate credit rationing 
and allow those investments to take place. As a result, the demand for non qualified labor and 
wages increase. It follows that the share of poor workers decreases and growth is promoted. 
The pro-poor effects of remittances have been demonstrated at the cross-country level by 
Adams and Page (2005) on a large sample of developing countries and recently by Acosta et 
al. (2008) in the case of Latin American countries.  
The second strand of the literature is linked to the impact of remittances on labor supply, 
which has been extensively studied at the micro-level. In an outstanding work which based on 
Indian micro data, Jayachandran (2006) demonstrates that the labor supply of the poorest 
individuals is inelastic if workers are closer to subsistence, more credit constrained and, less 
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able to migrate.1 As a result, the working poor wages are continually low. Any smoothing 
mechanism which enhances the labor supply elasticity – when market conditions are not 
favorable – is expected to reduce poverty. For instance, migration could affect the level of 
wage through two channels: the effect of migration itself and an effect via remittance inflows. 
In the first case, migration outflows affect the labor market outcomes by reducing the number 
of available workers in the region of origin. This would imply a higher equilibrium wage all 
else equal. For the second case, remittance inflows are supposed to increase the reservation 
wage of workers and may also increase the demand for labor when they are invested. 
Altogether, it results an upward pressure on the wage what would reduce the share of working 
poor.  
Be it driven by the demand or supply side, the effect of remittances is to reduce the number of 
poor workers. Our results suggest that the reasoning conducted mostly at micro levels can be 
generalized with macro-data. Remittances decrease in a substantial way the share of workers 
below 2 dollars per day, suggesting either that labor market adjustments take place allowing 
poor workers to supply labor in a more elastic way, or that more funds are spent on 
investment which in turns increases the demand for labor.  Moreover, while the level of 
remittances helps alleviating the number of poor workers, their predictability matters. From 
the supply side and in a context of risk adverse households, unpredictable remittances would 
not reduce household labor supply and hence the prevalence of working poor.2 From the 
demand side, unpredictable remittances could reduce the share of poor workers when it is 
                                                 
1
 Several papers have analyzed the labor supply elasticity in developing countries. The seminal work of Lewis 
(1954) assumes an horizontal labor supply function at the minimum subsistence level. This form has been 
tackled in three broad directions: negative slope function (Berg, 1961; Huang, 1976), positive slope function 
(Bardhan, 1979) and S-shaped labor supply curve (Dessing, 2002).  Recent work highlights that the labor supply 
curve becomes more inelastic in a context of poverty, credit-constraints and high migration costs (Jayachandran, 
2006). This result suggests that for poor constrained workers, the income effect exactly compensates for the 
substitution effect.     
2
 However, a recent paper by Cox-Edwards and Rodriguez-Oreggia (2009) found limited evidence of labor force 
participation effects of persistent remittances. This result challenges the previous finding of Amuedo-Dorantes 
and Pozo (2010b) that workers increase labor supply when remittance inflows are less predictable.  
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admitted that unpredictable remittances are more likely to be invested rather than to be fully 
consumed (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2010a). This suggests that there are two opposite 
forces in the relationship between the unpredictability of remittances and the prevalence of 
working poor.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II reviews the literature and gives preliminary 
evidence on the relationships between remittances and working poor at the macroeconomic 
level. Section III identifies the impact of remittances on the prevalence of working poor while 
controlling for the remittances endogeneity. Section IV tests the hypothesis that the impact of 
remittances on the prevalence of working poor depends on several factors: the income 
volatility, the remittances unpredictability and the financial development. Section V 
concludes.  
Section II. Preliminary evidence and overview of the existing literature 
Figure 1 presents the distribution of the regional averages of the percentage of working poor. 
As expected, the figure shows that the regions characterized by the highest prevalence of 
working poor are Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and East Asia and Pacific, with more than 
60% of people remunerated at less than 2$US per day. The Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA), Europe and Central Asia, and Latin America and Caribbean regions exhibit the 
lowest median values.  
Figure 1 about here. 
Figure 2 presents preliminary evidence suggesting a negative correlation between the 
dependency on remittance inflows and the prevalence of working poor in developing 
countries.  
Figure 2 about here. 
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There are two main channels through which remittances can exert an impact on low wages. 
One channel is related to the labor demand side, through the increase in investment, which is 
covered by remittances. This happens when remittances are used for financing small business 
projects (Woodruff and Zenteno, 2007; Chiodi et al., 2010; Adams and Cuecuecha, 2010). 
They allow the development of small entrepreneurships, which requires low qualified labor 
force. The demand for unskilled labor increases and wages at the bottom of the distribution 
should increase. To our knowledge, very few papers have investigated the impact of 
remittances on investment at the macro level (one exception is Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 
2009, and is based upon a dataset of 70 developing countries). More evidence is provided at 
the micro level. Dustman and Kirchkamp (2002) and Massey and Parado (1998) analyzed 
respectively the Turkish and Mexican cases. Woodruff and Zenteno (2007) reported that 
remittances are behind 20% of the capital invested in micro firms throughout urban Mexico. 
Chiodi et al. (2010) showed that in rural Mexico, poor rural families resort to remittances as a 
way to mitigate constraints that prevent them from investing in productive assets. Adams and 
Cuecuacha (2010) found that remittance-receiving households in Guatemala spend less at the 
margin on consumption (food) but more at the margin on investment (education and housing). 
The second channel relates to the labor supply side. In the standard neoclassical model of 
labor supply, workers optimize the allocation of their time to work and other activities, 
including leisure. Labor supply depends upon the reservation wage, which relates to how 
much extra earning an individual requires to be induced to give up one unit of leisure.  
The reservation wage is higher when individuals exposed to shocks can save and borrow, 
instead of continuing to work if market conditions deteriorate. Whenever individuals have 
access to formal and informal credit, their labor supply becomes more elastic.  Remittances 
constitute one such informal mechanism and their availability reduces the vulnerability of 
workers, who are closer to subsistence. Another mechanism is the possibility of borrowing or 
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drawing on savings, but in developing countries credit markets are underdeveloped and 
characterized by imperfections. As emphasized in Jayachandran (2006), the equilibrium wage 
is lower in an economy without smoothing mechanisms, because more people are obliged to 
work at a lower rate.  
One key notion is the distance of workers to the minimum level of subsistence. The closer to 
this minimum level are workers, the less elastic their labor supply is. Remittances help the 
poorest and more vulnerable categories of workers by enabling them to quit jobs, which are 
paid at low rates.  
 Micro-evidence supports this assumption. While the impact of remittances on the overall 
labor force participation is mixed,3 there is strong evidence that remittances decrease the 
participation of children, female adults and teenagers (Funkhouser, 2006; Calero et al., 2009; 
Bansak and Chezum, 2009; Ebeke, 2010). Children and women accept jobs at low wages, and 
they constitute in most developing countries the most vulnerable segment of the active 
population. This implies that remittances decrease the share of the most vulnerable workers 
paid at below 2 dollars per day. 
To our knowledge there are very few studies focusing directly on the impact of migration and 
remittances on the share of workers selling low wages. Jayachandran (2006) highlights two 
crucial results concerning landless. On the one hand, landless, who are the poorest, and hence 
the most liquidity constrained agents, tend to have an inelastic labor supply.  But, on the other 
hand, they are also more likely to migrate in response to bad shocks what contributes to 
                                                 
3
 This may arise from the fact that the impact is ambiguous if the revenue from the migrant replaces the revenue 
he would have procured without migrating. It may be due also to the difficult task of comparing strictly identical 
individuals and households. For addressing this identification problem, alternative econometric strategies have 
been proposed. Canales (2007) and Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) using different sources find no change 
for Mexican workers, while Rodriguez and Tiongson (2001) and Funkhouser (1992) provide evidence of a slight 
change in the labor force participation using data for Manila and Managa respectively. Gubert (2002) suggests 
that remittances act as an insurance and allow Malian workers to reduce their work. Cox-Edwards and 
Rodriguez-Oreggia (2009) using score matching techniques find little evidence of permanent remittances effect 
on labor force participation. 
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reduce the elasticity of wages to labor demand shocks. Most studies focus on the impact of 
remittances on the overall supply of labor, but disregard the distinction between poor workers 
and the others. This paper aims at filing the gap, by using macro data.  
The relationship between remittances, the share of working poor and, financial development 
is a priori ambiguous. Well-functioning financial markets, by lowering transaction costs, may 
help use remittances as a way either to better allocate time to work and leisure, or to finance 
projects that yield the highest returns and foster economic growth. Mundaca (2009) using a 
panel of Latin American and Caribbean countries showed that financial intermediation tends 
to increase the responsiveness of growth to remittances. Once can thus expect a 
complementary relationship between remittances and the financial development in the 
reduction of the prevalence of working poor in receiving countries. Alternatively, remittances 
can compensate for the lack of finance, be it for accommodating bad shocks or for starting 
productive activities. In this case, remittances act as a substitute for the banking system. 
Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) using a broad panel of developing countries found that 
formal credit and remittances are substitute rather than complement; remittances substitute for 
the lack of finance, which implies that their impact on growth is more pronounced whenever 
finance is missing. Following their line of argument, we will test the hypothesis that 
remittances are more efficient in reducing the number of poor workers whenever alternative 
funds are not available.   
Section III. Do remittances reduce the prevalence of working poor? Empirical 
investigation.  
To explore the link between remittances and working poor, we use a large dataset, which 
covers 85 countries over the period 1990-2007. As a starting exercise, we estimate the 
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interaction between remittances and the percentage of working poor by running simple OLS. 
We estimate the following model: 
tititititi XRw ,,,1, εηαβθ +++′+=                   (1) 
where w is the percentage of working poor in the total active population in each country i at 
year t. R is the remittance-to-GDP ratio, X is the matrix of control variables and iα  and tη  
represent the country fixed-effects and the time dummies, respectively. ti,ε  is the idiosyncratic 
error term. Our basic hypothesis is that 01 <θ , in other terms remittance inflows reduce the 
prevalence of working poor. 
Equation (1) includes the following control variables: 
Income volatility (measured as the standard deviation of the real GDP per capita growth rate 
over the last five years) is a proxy for shocks. Following Jayachandran (2006), we expect a 
positive impact of income shocks on the prevalence of working poor since macroeconomic 
volatility decrease the reservation wage (workers are more likely to accept low wages in time 
of negative shocks).  
Initial GDP per capita enters the set of control variables. We expect a negative correlation 
between the level of development and the prevalence of working poor. For instance, it could 
be a proxy for the existence and the compliance toward minimum wages legislation. 
Net emigration rate (measured as the difference between migration outflows and migration 
inflows over the total population) is an indicator of pressure on the labor market. An increase 
in net emigration rate increases the reservation wage, which in turns decreases the prevalence 
of working poor. The inclusion of this variable ensures that the effect of remittances is not 
confounded with the effect due to migration. Moreover, net migration changes both the 
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distribution of worker characteristics and the returns to these characteristics. Hanson (2007) 
has shown that labor force participation in high migration Mexican States decreases and that 
average wages in those States are higher in a range between 6% and 9%.  
Financial development (measured by the private credit-to-GDP ratio) reduces the prevalence 
of low wages via both the labor demand and the labor supply channel. The demand channel is 
promoted by the firms’ access to credit and private investment. The supply channel is based 
upon a wider possibility of drawing on savings and of borrowing, which renders labor supply 
more elastic (Jayachandran, 2006). As for remittances, more access to credit allows poor 
workers to adjust in a more optimal way. If there is a lack of finance, poor workers are 
blocked in poverty traps, as they have no choice but to work for low wages.  
Trade openness in developing countries could decrease the prevalence of working poor by 
increasing the labor demand in the agricultural sector and hence the agricultural wage. The 
same effect exists in the natural resources sector and altogether, the working poor rate is 
lower. The international competition induced by trade openness leads to productivity gains in 
the tradable sector and shifts the level of wage above its previous value.4 Developing 
countries export commodities whose production requires unskilled labor, and unskilled 
workers’ wages in sending developing countries tend to increase.  
Government consumption-to-GDP ratio is a proxy for the share of public employment in 
which the number of working poor is much lower. 
                                                 
4
 It is worth noting that a high level of trade openness means a higher exposition to external risks which could 
translates into a lower reservation wage. However, since we already control for macroeconomic instability, this 
effect is drained-off.  
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Foreign direct investment net inflows-to-GDP ratio controls for the fact that foreign direct 
investment inflows increase the domestic demand for labor and hence reduce the prevalence 
of working poor.5  
Education level (measured as the percentage of people having completed the secondary cycle) 
enters the set of control variables. A higher education level increase the reservation wage, and 
decrease the prevalence of working poor. 
Income inequality (approximated by the Gini coefficient of income distribution) is introduced 
to ensure that the estimated effect of remittances on the prevalence of working poor is net of 
the effect of remittances on income inequality.6 
Inflation rate controls for the fact that low-wage earners suffer more from the loss of real 
wage induced by inflation. They have to increase their labor supply in order to compensate for 
this loss of revenue, even more for working poor, who do not have other way of smoothing 
consumption but to supply more work. 
Rural population rate is negatively correlated with the productivity of workers in rural area. 
Hence a positive association between the rural population and the prevalence of working poor 
is expected. 
The dependent variable is measured as the share of active people who receive as wage less 
than 2 $US and comes from the ILO-KILM dataset.7 Remittances record the money sent by 
                                                 
5
 Chen et al. (2011) showed that FDI inflows increase inter-enterprise wage inequality in China. Their results 
highlighted that FDI lead to a negative spillover in terms of the wage in domestic firms. This arises when 
competition from multinationals may reduce the market share of local firms, which drives such firms under the 
minimum efficiency or even crowds them out. Nunnenkamp et al. (2007) showed that even if FDI inflows 
enhance economic growth and reduce poverty, they also widen income disparities between urban and rural areas 
in Bolivia. This suggests that FDI inflows can exert a pro-poor effect in receiving countries but at the same time, 
they can induce regional disparities. 
6
 Some recent macroeconomic papers have tested the impact of remittance inflows on the income inequality in 
the receiving countries (Koechlin and Leon, 2007; Acosta et al., 2008; Ebeke and Le Goff, 2010). 
7
 See appendix for a detailed presentation of this variable. 
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workers who live abroad for at least one year.8 Remittance data are drawn from the World 
Bank Tables. Except trade openness, government consumption and per capita income (which 
come from the Penn World Table 6.3. dataset), all remaining control variables are drawn from 
the World Bank Tables. The sample covers at most 85 countries over the period 1990-2007. 
Countries list and descriptive statistics are provided in appendix at the end of the paper 
(Tables A1 and A2).  
Table 1 displays the results obtained by running OLS. Whatever the specification, be it with a 
smaller number of controls in the first columns or a larger one in the subsequent columns, all 
variables have the expected sign. When all controls are included, higher income volatility, 
larger income inequality and higher rural population rate are associated with a higher number 
of poor workers. Furthermore, the initial level of economic development, the degree of trade 
openness and the level of education (except when the income per capita is excluded from the 
specification) tend to reduce the prevalence of workers paid at below two dollars per day. 
Convergence, competition, and income distribution do influence the share of poor workers in 
the active population. Some coefficients, although non-significant, have the right sign: net 
emigration rate, private credit to GDP ratio, government consumption over GDP, FDI over 
GDP, inflation rate. Those variables might suffer from colinearity when estimated jointly with 
other variables.   
Table 1 about here. 
It is worth noting that whatever the specification, remittance inflows reduce the prevalence of 
working poor and this effect is highly significant. The estimated coefficient ranges from -
0.885 (first column) to -0.507 (column 10).  
                                                 
8
 We use the narrower definition of remittances by squeezing the compensations of employees and migrant 
transfers. This procedure follows Chami, Fullenkamp and Gapen (2009). 
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The main drawback behind these preliminary results is the simultaneity bias resulting from 
the two ways causality running from the prevalence of working poor to remittances and vice 
et versa. If remittances reduce the number of poor workers, it is likely that poverty does 
induce both migration and remittances to compensate for low wages at home. OLS results 
might be therefore biased toward zero and they can underestimate the ‘true’ impact. 
To deal with the endogeneity bias, we use an instrumental variable approach. The instrument 
is the potential earning in the migrants’ host countries, which is proxied by real GDP per 
capita weighted by the share of each destination country for each sending country.9 This 
procedure follows recent macroeconomic works on remittances which have used the per 
capita income in migrant host countries as the exclusion restriction (Acosta et al., 2008; 
Acosta et al., 2009; Aggarwal et al., 2010). There is now an accepted result showing that 
remittances are positively associated with the economic conditions abroad in the host 
countries (Freund and Spatafora, 2008; Aggarwal et al., 2010). Meanwhile, there is no reason 
to suspect for a direct link between the economic conditions abroad and the prevalence of 
working poor when trade openness and FDI are already controlled for.  
Table 2 presents the results of the first-stage equations of remittances. In column 1, the real 
GDP per capita in host countries is used as the instrument. Its coefficient (6.34) turns out to be 
highly significant and positive (the F-test of the instrumentation equation for remittances is 
higher compared to the Stock et al., 2002 rule of thumb of 10), which means that the sum of 
GDP per capita weighted by the shares of destination countries in each origin country is a 
good proxy for remittances. In columns 2 and 4, the results of the second stage equation 
suggest that the effect of remittances on the prevalence of working poor is negative and highly 
                                                 
9
 The bilateral migration matrix comes from the World Bank web site:  
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/0,,contentMDK:21154867~
pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,00.html 
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significant. The coefficients stand at – 1.2 and – 1.5, respectively. These values are higher (in 
absolute term) than previous OLS coefficients (Table 1) given the positive OLS bias.  
Table 2 about here. 
Using estimates in Table 2, we can compute the change in the prevalence of working poor 
induced by a one standard deviation increase in the remittance-to-GDP ratio (set equal to 
4.6%). The decrease in poor workers yields 6 percentage points (column 2), for an average 
prevalence of working poor standing at 48%. This impact is quite substantial.  
Our results provide strong preliminary evidence that the level of remittances leads to a 
substantial decrease in poverty (see Jadotte, 2009; Justino and Shemyakina, 2010). We turn 
now to the influence of income volatility, be it wage or remittances unpredictability.  
Section IV. Testing for heterogeneity in the working poor-remittance nexus. 
As shown in the previous section, remittances reduce the prevalence of working poor. The 
model is based upon the evidence that poor workers cannot adjust their labor supply, because 
they are close to the subsistence level. When labor market conditions deteriorate, they cannot 
substitute more leisure to labor. Having no access to credit – evidence about the lack of 
formal credit in developing countries is widely acknowledged – they cannot borrow the funds 
which would enable them to survive. Remittances act as insurance and allow workers to 
adjust their labor supply. Remittances are often seen as source of stable and regular income. 
What also happens if remittances are unpredictable? Indeed, household’s decision-making 
(labor supply or investment motive) may be impacted by the unpredictability of income 
including remittances. 
We make three conjectures. We assume first that remittances should be more efficient in 
fighting against selling low wages whenever income volatility is higher; second remittances 
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should be more efficient if they are provided in a predictable way; lastly, remittances as a 
mechanism to cope with external shocks should be less efficient when formal credit is 
available.  
4.1 Remittances and income volatility  
If remittances act as an insurance for accommodating shocks, they should be more efficient 
when income volatility is higher. Put differently, remittances can reduce the sensitivity of low 
wages with respect to the income volatility. This assumption is tested with the following 
model:  
titititititititi XRRVVw ,,,4,,3,2, * εηαβθθθ +++′+++=                 (2) 
where V stands for income volatility in each country i at year t and is measured by the rolling 
standard deviation of the real GDP per capita growth rate over the last five years.  
If the marginal impact of income volatility on the prevalence of working poor decreases with 
the level of remittances one would get, 02 >θ  and 03 <θ . Moreover, above a given threshold 
denoted R*, remittances are fully stabilizing: 
3
2*
,32
,
, 0
θ
θθθ τ
τ
τ
−=⇒=+=
∂
∂
RR
V
w
i
i
i
. 
Table 3 presents the results derived from the instrumental variable strategy.10 The diagnostic 
tests in the first-stage regressions do not reject the validity of the IV approach. As expected, 
the interactive term is negative and significant whereas the additive term of GDP per capita 
growth volatility is positive but weakly significant. The threshold level for the remittance 
                                                 
10
 We use the same instrument as in Table 2 and the interactive term of remittances crossed with the 
macroeconomic volatility is instrumented by the interactive term of the excluded instrument for remittances 
crossed with the GDP per capita growth volatility. 
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ratio stands at 7% which implies that for 21% countries in the sample, macroeconomic 
volatility does not increase any more the prevalence of working poor. Remittance inflows are 
large enough to fully absorb the shocks.  
Table 3 about here. 
4.2 Volatility of remittances  
The impact of both the level of remittances and the unpredictability surrounding those flows 
has already been studied at the micro level by Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2010b) and Cox-
Edwards and Rodriguez-Oreggia (2009). The authors investigate how different remittances 
patterns influence the labor supply of recipient household. Our study aims at testing the effect 
of the unpredictability of remittance inflows on the share of working poor and therefore seeks 
to generalize the previous microeconometric findings established for some Latin American 
countries. In this paper, the proxy of the remittances unpredictability is their volatility.11  
The following model is estimated: 
titititititi XRRVw ,,,6,5, ε+η+α+β′+θ+θ=               (3) 
where RV stands for the volatility of remittances in each country i at year t.12 While 6θ  is 
expected to be negative, the sign of 5θ
 
is a priori unknown. From one hand, according to the 
permanent income hypothesis, unpredictable remittances should be invested more than 
predictable remittances, the latter being mostly used for consumption. Through the induced 
additional demand for labor, the impact on workers paid at below 2$ US should be to reduce 
                                                 
11
 This choice does not mean that all the volatility of remittances is unpredictable. We assume only that the 
degree of unpredictability tends to increase when remittances become less stable. A more accurate measure of 
the unpredictability involves constructing a model of expectations (or time series models designed for high 
frequency data such as GARCH models )  that goes beyond the objectives of the paper 
12
 The volatility of remittances is computed as the five-year rolling window standard error of the residual 
component of the log of remittances explained by its one-year lagged value and a quadratic time trend. The 
remittance model is estimated for each country separately.  
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their number, and 5θ should be negative. From the other hand, if remittances are not a way to 
smooth consumption of workers when they are unpredictable,  5θ  could be positive 
(households do not reduce their labor supply). The sign of this coefficient is therefore a matter 
of empirics.  
Results in table 4 (first column) are obtained by running our instrumental variable strategy. 
The coefficient associated with the volatility of remittances is positive at the low level of 
significance of 10%. They suggest that the second effect through the labor supply is more 
important than the effect through private investment.  
In a slightly modified version of equation (3), we consider that the volatility of remittances 
enters the equation in a multiplicative way:  
tititititititi XRVRRw ,,,,8,7, * ε+η+α+β′+θ+θ=                   (4) 
We test now the hypothesis that 07 <θ  and 08 >θ . In that setting, 7θ measures the effect of 
the level of remittances when the volatility of remittances is set at 0 whereas tiRV ,87 θθ +  
identifies the marginal effect of remittances for a given level of remittance volatility.13   
Column 2 in table 4 presents the results obtained through our instrumental variable strategy.14 
We find that 07 <θ  and 08 >θ .  
Combining the results of both columns indicate that the volatility of remittances contributes 
not only to increase the prevalence of working poor, but do increase also the marginal impact 
of the level of remittance inflows on the prevalence of poor workers. In other words, 
                                                 
13
 In the model (4), the remittance volatility is not introduced additively among the set of control variables 
because its coefficient would identify the effect of remittance volatility without remittances. What seems 
difficult to assess. 
14
 Remittances volatility is considered as strictly exogenous.  
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2011.09 
 
 
20
remittance inflows alleviate the prevalence of poverty but to a lesser extent under a higher 
unpredictability surrounding those inflows. 
Table 4 about here. 
4.3 Remittances versus Finance 
We now investigate whether the effectiveness of remittances in reducing the prevalence of 
poor workers increases with the shallowness nature of the domestic financial system. We 
adopt a threshold model, which determines endogenously the private credit-to-GDP ratio 
above which the relationship between poverty and remittances inflows vanishes. 
The test for non-linearity is implemented with rolling estimations for different values taken by 
the ratio of private credit. A dummy variable FDd  interacted with the remittance variable is 
specified. FDd  is equal to 1 if the country has a value of the private credit ratio greater than 
*FD
 and 0 otherwise.15 The underlying methodology in the case of endogenous regressors 
has been implemented by Masten et al. (2008), Chami and Hakura al. (2009) and Combes and 
Ebeke (2010).  
We therefore estimate the following equation:  
titititiFDtititi XFDdRRw ,,,11,10,9, * εηαβθθθ +++′+++=               (5) 
                     with [ ]*=
,
FDFDd tiFD ≥1
 
where FD is the private credit-to-GDP ratio in each country i at year t. The hypothesis tested 
is that 09 <θ  and 010 >θ , in other terms the absolute value of  the marginal impact of 
remittances on the share of poor workers decreases with the level of financial development.  
                                                 
15
 We also performed simple estimations by including an interactive term of remittances crossed with the private 
credit ratio. Unfortunately, the coefficient associated with the interactive term was never statistically significant 
different from zero.  
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The top 5% and bottom 5% of the observations of the private credit ratio are dropped to 
ensure a feasible identification of the threshold. Private credit-to-GDP thresholds by 
increments of 0.5 percent are explored. Each equation corresponding to a different threshold 
is estimated by the instrumental variable method. The optimal threshold is the one which 
maximizes the F-tests of the remittance and remittances*dFD instrumentation equations for all 
the models in which 9θ  and 10θ  are individually significant.16 Testing nonlinear effect refers 
simply to the test of the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the interactive variable 10θ  is 
equal to zero.  
The optimal cutoff which maximizes the F-tests statistics is set at a private credit over GDP 
ratio equal to 20%. This is very close to the thresholds values in Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 
(2009) in their study using the level of economic growth as the dependent variable. More than 
60% of the countries are concerned here by this threshold, and the median value of the private 
credit-to-GDP ratio in the sample stands at 19%. 
Table 5 displays the results, which are based upon the two regimes. The first regime includes 
countries in which the level of financial development is under 20%. For countries belonging 
to this regime the marginal impact of remittances is the highest (in absolute value). The 
second regime consists in more financially developed countries (the ratio of private credit 
over GDP is over 20%). In the latter the impact of remittances, although still negative,17 is 
significantly lower in absolute value. This finding supports and extends the thesis, according 
to which there is a substitution effect between remittances and financial development in 
developing countries (see Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009). 
                                                 
16
 According to the criterion of the significance of the second stage coefficients ( 9θ  and 10θ ), only two 
thresholds emerged (private credit ratio of 20% and 48%). The threshold of 20% of GDP beats the second one 
for all the values of the F-test couple. 
17
 Indeed, the sum of the two coefficients associated with the remittance variable remains negative (- 3.04 + 1.44 
= - 1.6) and statistically different from 0 (the corresponding P-value of the restriction stands at 0.07). 
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Table 5 about here. 
 
Section V. Conclusion 
Our findings are based upon a large data set which covers a wide range of developing 
countries over an extended period of time, namely 85 countries over 1990-2007. We 
generalize the existing literature which is mainly based on micro studies, and we demonstrate 
that remittances are key for reducing the number of working poor. For an average prevalence 
of working poor set equal to 48%, a one standard deviation increase in the remittance-to-GDP 
ratio decreases the number of poor workers by a substantial 6 percentage points.  
The efficiency of remittances depends upon the level of income volatility characterizing the 
economy. For a remittance ratio equal to 7% of GDP any increase in the macro-volatility is 
fully compensated, which means that income volatility does not impact any more the 
vulnerability of the poorest in the labor market. The degree of remittance predictability also 
matters. Remittance inflows alleviate the prevalence of poor workers but to a lesser extent 
under a higher unpredictability surrounding those inflows. Finally, we found that remittances 
and the domestic financial system are substitutes. For less financially developed countries the 
marginal impact of remittances in reducing the prevalence of working poor is the highest in 
absolute value. In contrast, in more financially developed countries, where the ratio of private 
credit over GDP is above 20% of GDP, this marginal impact is still negative, but significantly 
lower in absolute value.  
Remittances appear as a strategy for fighting against poverty (see for instance the G8 summit 
declaration of 2009 at Aquila). Their pro poor effects through the reduction of low wages 
could be enhanced by acting on two fronts: the level of remittances and their productive uses. 
In the first case, it would be useful to reduce the transaction costs associated with remitting 
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(especially in less financially developed countries where the marginal impact of remittances 
on low wages was found in this paper to be stronger and where the transfer costs are higher). 
In the second case, it is crucial to promote the reinvestment of remittances. Indeed, the 
reinvestment of remittances helps prevent from a sub-optimal equilibrium characterized by 
higher wages and weaker labor participation. The reinvestment of remittances could lead to a 
better equilibrium with higher wage, more labor and capital, triggered by the diffusion effects 
of remittances in the economy.  
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Figure 1: Distribution of the prevalence of working poor in the developing regions (1990 – 2007) 
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Note: In box plots, the lower and upper hinges of each box show the 25th and 75th percentiles of the samples, the 
line in the box indicates the respective medians, and the end-points of whiskers mark next adjacent values. EAP: 
East Asia and Pacific, ECA: Europe and Central Asia, LAC: Latin America and Caribbean, MENA: Middle East 
and North Africa, SA: South Asia, SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Source: ILO KILM 6th edition dataset. 
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Figure 2: Correlation between the prevalence of working poor and remittance inflows (1990-2007). 
ALB
ARG
ARM
BDI
BEN
BGD
BOL
BRA
BWA
CIV
CMR
COL
CRI ECUEGY
GHA GMB
GTM
GUY
HND
HTI
IND
IRN
JAM
JOR
KAZ
KEN
KGZ
KHM
LAO LKA
LSO
MAR
MEXMLI
MNG
MOZ
MRT
WIMYS NER
NPL
PAK
PAN
PER
PHL
PRYRUS RWA
SEN
SLVTGO
THA
TUN
TUR
UGA
VEN
YEM
ZMB
-
40
-
20
0
20
40
Pr
e
va
le
n
ce
 
of
 
w
or
ki
n
g 
po
o
r 
re
si
du
a
ls
-5 0 5 10 15
Remittance-to-GDP residuals
Data sources: ILO KILM dataset and World Bank tables
 
Note: Data are averaged over the period 1990-2007.Working poor rate and remittance-to-GDP ratio are residuals 
derived from pooled regressions using annual data of these variables regressed on the same set of control 
variables (as in Tables 1 – 5). This gives adjusted measures of the prevalence of working poor rate and 
remittance-to-GDP ratio that are purged from any colinearity with the determinants of the prevalence of working 
poor.
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Table 1: Remittances and Percentage of Working Poor, OLS-FE results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
                        
Remittance-to-GDP ratio -0.885*** -0.816*** -0.731*** -0.720*** -0.662*** -0.607*** -0.587*** -0.613*** -0.616*** -0.507*** -0.519*** 
 (-4.711) (-3.624) (-3.708) (-3.713) (-3.702) (-4.176) (-4.193) (-4.451) (-4.407) (-3.153) (-3.444) 
Real GDP per capita growth volatility 0.0275  0.0332 0.0337 0.0347 0.100 0.0940 0.143** 0.144** 0.147** 0.143** 
 (0.754)  (0.997) (0.999) (0.861) (1.425) (1.274) (2.008) (2.002) (2.314) (2.104) 
Initial real GDP per capita  -16.23* -17.54** -17.65** -5.382  -9.497* -14.12*** -14.13***  -11.59** 
  (-1.970) (-2.117) (-2.125) (-0.812)  (-1.823) (-2.918) (-2.891)  (-2.203) 
Net Emigration rate    -0.166 -0.334 -0.171 -0.264 -0.448 -0.449 -0.345 -0.454 
    (-0.493) (-1.404) (-0.651) (-1.036) (-1.291) (-1.320) (-1.053) (-1.447) 
Private credit-to-GDP ratio     -0.0425 -0.0726 -0.0340 -0.0696 -0.0707 -0.0841 -0.0500 
     (-0.537) (-1.026) (-0.435) (-1.067) (-1.081) (-1.218) (-0.721) 
Trade openness     -0.0771* -0.0532 -0.0431 -0.0482* -0.0465 -0.0617*** -0.0498** 
     (-1.781) (-1.435) (-1.230) (-1.743) (-1.670) (-2.884) (-2.190) 
Government consumption-to-GDP ratio     4.970 4.657 3.856 0.499 0.309 0.776 -0.0490 
     (1.029) (0.670) (0.548) (0.0774) (0.0474) (0.125) (-0.00780) 
Foreign direct investment-to-GDP ratio     -0.0979 -0.0503 -0.0700 -0.0690 -0.0664 -0.0464 -0.0681 
     (-0.513) (-0.264) (-0.367) (-0.500) (-0.469) (-0.330) (-0.493) 
Education level      -0.343** -0.251 -0.197 -0.170 -0.102 -0.0411 
      (-2.074) (-1.488) (-1.457) (-1.166) (-0.582) (-0.250) 
Income inequality         0.798*** 0.796*** 0.764*** 0.799*** 
        (4.602) (4.583) (4.156) (4.541) 
Inflation rate         0.909 0.310 0.473 
         (0.954) (0.356) (0.537) 
Rural population rate          0.559** 0.416* 
          (2.485) (1.768) 
Intercept 49.02*** 182.1*** 192.7*** 193.8*** 84.69 44.20** 122.1** 133.6*** 133.7*** -9.848 91.17 
 (69.77) (2.695) (2.840) (2.845) (1.437) (2.071) (2.552) (2.736) (2.707) (-0.444) (1.598) 
            
Observations 305 314 305 305 270 231 231 229 227 227 227 
R-squared 0.073 0.140 0.149 0.150 0.123 0.154 0.167 0.310 0.311 0.305 0.323 
Number of countries 83 85 83 83 73 61 61 61 59 59 59 
Notes: Robust T-statistics in parentheses             
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1            
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Table 2: Remittances and Working Poor rate, IV-FE results 
  First-stage IV-FE First-stage IV-FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Remittance-to-GDP ratio  -1.499**  -1.258** 
  (-2.089)  (-2.159) 
Real GDP per capita growth volatility 0.00566 0.157** 0.00441 0.151*** 
 (0.272) (2.420) (0.221) (2.836) 
Initial real GDP per capita   -2.841 -12.27** 
   (-1.272) (-2.105) 
Net Emigration rate 0.101 -0.239 0.0739 -0.381 
 (0.626) (-0.515) (0.567) (-1.091) 
Private credit-to-GDP ratio -0.0273 -0.0969 -0.0197 -0.0575 
 (-1.231) (-1.397) (-0.826) (-0.909) 
Trade openness 4.80e-05 -0.0385 0.00159 -0.0318 
 (0.00337) (-0.991) (0.108) (-0.807) 
Government consumption-to-GDP ratio 3.868** 3.706 3.708** 2.081 
 (2.084) (0.669) (2.167) (0.433) 
Foreign direct investment-to-GDP ratio 0.0101 -0.00773 0.00303 -0.0406 
 (0.200) (-0.0492) (0.0505) (-0.255) 
Education level -0.0789 -0.108 -0.0680 -0.0423 
 (-1.188) (-0.540) (-0.948) (-0.227) 
Inflation rate 0.615* 0.942 0.652 0.953 
 (1.879) (0.832) (0.960) (0.519) 
Income inequality 0.0149 0.774*** 0.0235 0.808*** 
 (0.344) (5.191) (0.438) (5.683) 
Rural population rate -0.138 0.173 -0.158 0.120 
 (-1.177) (0.447) (-1.464) (0.352) 
     
Exclusion restriction     
     
log Real GDP per capita in host countries 6.340***  6.695***  
 (4.022)  (4.542)  
     
Observations 216 216 216 216 
R-squared 0.263 0.196 0.271 0.262 
F-test of remittance instrumentation equation 16.18  20.63  
Number of countries 48 48 48 48 
Notes: Robust T statistics in parentheses.      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Table 3: Remittances, income shocks and Working poor rate 
  IV-FE 
    
GDP per capita growth volatility 0.688*** 
 (4.243) 
Remittance * GDP per capita growth volatility -0.0974*** 
 (-2.645) 
Remittance-to-GDP ratio -0.398 
 (-0.537) 
Initial GDP per capita -6.285 
 (-1.155) 
Net Emigration rate -0.501* 
 (-1.657) 
Private credit-to-GDP ratio -0.0392 
 (-0.500) 
Trade openness -0.0527* 
 (-1.648) 
Government consumption-to-GDP ratio 0.956 
 (0.138) 
Foreign direct investment-to-GDP ratio 0.0435 
 (0.226) 
Education level -0.0177 
 (-0.0942) 
Inflation rate 1.962 
 (1.252) 
Income inequality 0.756*** 
 (4.537) 
Rural population rate 0.419 
 (1.048) 
  
Observations 216 
R-squared 0.167 
F-stat of Remittance instrumentation: P-value 0.002 
F-stat of Remittance*Growth volatility instrumentation: P-value 0.030 
Joint significance of GDP volatility coefficients: P-value 0.000 
Remittance threshold for full stabilization 7% 
Number of countries above the threshold 10 
Percentage of countries above the threshold (%) 21% 
Number of countries  48 
Notes: Robust T-statistics in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 4: Remittances, remittance unpredictability and Working poor rate  
  IV-FE IV-FE 
 (1) (2) 
      
Remittance-to-GDP ratio -2.128** -2.211** 
 (-2.171) (-2.138) 
Remittance unpredictability 6.636*  
 (1.762)  
Remittance * Remittance unpredictability   2.195* 
  (1.680) 
GDP per capita growth volatility 0.0940 0.0830 
 (1.280) (0.884) 
Initial real GDP per capita -18.05** -15.06 
 (-2.037) (-1.540) 
Net Emigration rate 0.614 0.823 
 (0.888) (1.164) 
Private credit-to-GDP ratio -0.130 -0.0827 
 (-1.295) (-0.951) 
Trade openness 0.00290 -0.00742 
 (0.0416) (-0.116) 
Government consumption-to-GDP ratio 18.92* 16.13** 
 (1.847) (2.048) 
Foreign direct investment-to-GDP ratio -0.192 -0.142 
 (-0.852) (-0.628) 
Education level -0.233 -0.178 
 (-0.967) (-0.754) 
Inflation rate -0.00610 0.649 
 (-0.00552) (0.321) 
Income inequality 0.844*** 0.790*** 
 (3.862) (3.818) 
Rural population rate -0.686 -0.362 
 (-1.035) (-0.606) 
   
Observations 152 152 
R-squared 0.119 0.110 
F-stat remittance instrumentation: P-value 0.034 0.009 
F-stat Remittance* Remittance unpredictability instrumentation: P-
value  0.000 
Joint significance of remittance coefficients: P-value  0.081 
Number of countries 33 33 
Notes: Robust T-statistics in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Table 5: Remittances, financial development and Working Poor 
rate, IV-FE results 
    
    
Remittance-to-GDP ratio -3.035** 
 (-2.514) 
Remittances * 1[Credit ≥ 20%] 1.439** 
 (2.019) 
Remittance unpredictability 6.794* 
 (1.910) 
Private credit-to-GDP ratio -0.169* 
 (-1.798) 
Initial real GDP per capita -19.77** 
 (-2.226) 
Real GDP per capita growth volatility 0.162** 
 (2.165) 
Income inequality 0.839*** 
 (3.619) 
Net Emigration rate 0.631 
 (1.117) 
Government consumption-to-GDP ratio 15.20** 
 (2.089) 
Foreign direct investment-to-GDP ratio -0.161 
 (-0.816) 
Inflation rate -0.0131 
 (-0.0127) 
Education level -0.132 
 (-0.661) 
Trade openness -0.0339 
 (-0.535) 
Rural population rate -0.432 
 (-0.766) 
  
Observations 152 
R-squared 0.248 
F-stat Remittance instrumentation: P-value 0.046 
F-stat Remittances * 1[Credit ≥ 20%]: P-value 0.000 
Joint significance of remittance coefficients: P-value 0.038 
Number of countries above the threshold 21 
Percentage of countries above the threshold (%) 64% 
Number of countries 33 
Notes: Robust T-statistics in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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APPENDIX 
Measuring Working poor 
1. Working poor definition 
Working poor are defined as employed persons living in households in which per-capita 
income/expenditure is below the poverty line (Majid, 2001; Kapsos, 2005). The poverty is defined at 
the household level while employment status is defined at the individual level. In order to maximize 
comparability across countries, international poverty lines are used, whereby prices in local currencies 
are converted using purchasing power parity exchange rates and adjusting for inflation. Employment 
status is determined at the individual level.  
2. How to compute working poverty estimates 
If we had direct measures such as the poverty rate of working age population, labor force participation 
rate of poor, unemployment rate of poor, the estimate of the number of working poor would be: 
* *(1 )p poor poor poorw pop LFPR U= −                             (1) 
Where pw , poorpop , poorLFPR  and poorU  are respectively the number of working poor, the working 
age population of poor, the labor force participation of poor and the unemployment rate of poor. 
However, due to the fact that the joint distribution with population share, labor force and 
unemployment rate of poor are not known, the following three assumptions are made: 
- The poverty rate of working age population is equal to that of the population as a whole 
- Labor force participation rate of poor is equal to that of population as a whole 
- Unemployment rate of poor is negligible 
This latter assumption is fully discussed in Majid (2001). 
According to the above assumption, the formula used to compute working poverty is: 
 
*pw povertyrate employed=  
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Table A1: Descriptive statistics      
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Percentage of working poor 385 48.06 31.02 0 95 
Remittance-to-GDP ratio 364 3.22 4.60 0 22.84 
Remittance unpredictability 237 0.28 0.32 0.01 1.55 
log Real GDP per capita in host countries 433 9.65 0.95 6.45 10.71 
log Real GDP per capita 432 8.21 0.83 5.89 9.69 
Real GDP per capita growth volatility 417 6.01 13.09 0.07 115.11 
Net emigration rate 440 1.03 3.15 -24.02 28.39 
Private credit-to-GDP ratio 373 25.64 24.15 1.14 165.96 
Trade openness 431 73.19 38.12 14.78 222.29 
Government consumption-to-GDP 437 19.47 8.74 3.73 57.41 
Net FDI inflows-to-GDP 434 3.08 3.61 -6.95 30.93 
Education level  359 16.86 12.07 0.62 62.93 
     (% of people having completed the secondary level)      
Income inequality (Gini) 397 43.84 9.46 16.80 74.30 
log (1 + inflation/100) 403 0.16 0.32 -0.05 3.01 
Rural population (% total population) 440 50.43 21.66 7.36 93.34 
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Table A2. Countries in the sample (85)     
Albania China Honduras Mongolia Suriname 
Angola Colombia India Morocco Tajikistan 
Argentina Costa Rica Iran Mozambique Thailand 
Armenia Cote d'Ivoire Jordan Namibia Togo 
Azerbaijan Croatia Kazakhstan Nepal Trinidad and Tobago 
Bangladesh Dominican Rep. Kenya Nicaragua Tunisia 
Belarus Ecuador Kyrgyz Rep. Niger Turkey 
Benin Egypt Lao PDR Nigeria Uganda 
Bolivia El Salvador Lesotho Pakistan Ukraine 
Bosnia and Herz. Ethiopia Liberia Panama Venezuela 
Botswana Gambia Macedonia Paraguay Yemen 
Brazil Georgia Madagascar Peru Zambia 
Burkina Faso Ghana Malawi Philippines  
Burundi Guatemala Malaysia Russian Fed.  
Cambodia Guinea Mali Rwanda  
Cameroon Guinea-Bissau Mauritania Senegal  
Cape Verde Guyana Mexico Sierra Leone  
Chile Haiti Moldova Sri Lanka   
 
 
